What to do in the face of Putin’s advance in Ukraine? The question stopped being hypothetical this week. The result is that sanctions come to occupy the center of international attention.
There is talk, for example, of suspending purchases of gas and oil from Russia, limiting the country’s access to the international financial system, restricting the sale of certain products, freezing assets of certain citizens or companies and even excluding Moscow from Swift, the of international payments.
Economic sanctions are designed to affect the decision maker’s political calculus — in this case, to push Putin back. Typically, as the problem worsens, more painful punishments come into the package.
This week, several countries have already announced measures against Russia. All the fury against Putin will take the form of sanctions — swift and severe, in the words of the US. But there’s a catch: this doesn’t usually work.
Even moderate expectations, because international sanctions do not have a brilliant record. If the aim is to force a change in behavior, they have failed, from Cuba to North Korea, from Iran to Venezuela, via Syria. Certainly, the economic situation of these countries is very serious (and the local population suffers the consequences). But years or even decades of punishment have failed to convince their leaders to do what was expected of them.
International sanctions also entail economic and political risks for those who adopt them. Almost always those who apply the measures feel some of the pain. For example, to stop buying gas from Moscow means, for Germany, to give up its main source of external supply. For the US, isolating Russia has the effect of bringing it closer to China. In a real sanction, it is difficult to avoid shooting yourself in the foot.
The measures, of course, tend to have a significant economic impact on the affected country, in addition to leading to some international isolation. In these circumstances, it is possible that the dissatisfaction generated mainly by the deterioration of the economy is channeled against local authorities, creating a pro-change broth.
But it is also possible that the population will end up blaming foreign powers for domestic ills. In Cuba, Venezuela and elsewhere, local authorities are exploring precisely this narrative. Sanctions, rather than encouraging behavior change, can have the opposite effect—they could spur resistance, even if at a high humanitarian cost.
Assuming it is anchored in international law, a good sanction is one that does not need to be applied. This is when the credible threat that there is a high price to pay is enough to make a leader think twice, for example, before invading another country.
However, the poor record of international sanctions undermines its deterrent potential — including in Russia today. In 2014, following the annexation of Crimea, the West imposed a package of sanctions. It is true that the economy and the population suffered as a result of the measures, but if the objective was to make Moscow give up the operation, the measures failed. Moreover, they still weakened the country, but not its president.
The Russian attack on Ukraine this week proves that, for Putin, the prospect of sanctions is not a deterrent. Perhaps it is too much to hope that they in themselves, however harsh they may be, will make you change your mind.
The best one could hope for from these punishments is that they serve as an incentive for real negotiation. Sanctions alone, however quick and severe, are unlikely to save the homeland.
