By Marc Champion*

Last year, some Western leaders began boasting about Russia’s “strategic defeat” in Ukraine. This has always been a terrible idea, and one that President Vladimir Putin never tires of citing as he promotes the false claim that he sent his military across the border to defend Russia from Western aggression, rather than invading a former colony to profit.

Now, after more than 1,000 days of bloodshed, we are finally beginning to see the outline of such a strategic defeat emerge. The only potential losers are Ukraine and its allies, not Putin.

I am not trying here to blame Donald Trump in advance if in the new year Putin succeeds in crushing Ukraine and achieving his war aims. The inappropriate, destructive rhetoric from some of the US president-elect’s family members and advisers is not helping and must stop. But the primary fault lies elsewhere.

Some Republicans who support Trump’s “peace now” approach say — often accurately — that they once advocated a much stronger policy of propping up Kiev than the Biden administration. They wanted the White House and America’s allies in Europe to give Ukraine a wider range of military aid, in larger quantities and much more quickly. The war continues today, with Ukrainian forces struggling to hold on, largely because this did not happen in 2014 or 2022.

Less frankly, these same Republicans are now saying the only way forward is to explain to the Ukrainians that time is up and they must accept whatever peace deal Putin is willing to offer, according to a timeline of Trump’s choosing. Let’s hope they don’t chew on Putin’s renewed nuclear threats now as the Kremlin reveals it has put a new doctrine into effect. I’ve written before about why a nuclear strike is unlikely.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agrees that the war must end next year. The dispute is about how. Kiev, as well as its Baltic, British, Polish and Scandinavian friends, understand that Putin is not currently motivated to negotiate anything and therefore will not. He has the advantage on the battlefield and sees the resolve of the West crumbling before his eyes. When Putin says peace, he means the surrender of Ukraine.

There is only one answer to this conundrum that does not result in a strategic defeat for Ukraine and its NATO allies: a rapid shift to align Ukrainian procurement and force regeneration with a new goal of achieving a lasting ceasefire that leaves Ukraine and safe and independent. This must be done in consultation and agreement, an outcome designed to prevent Putin’s renewed nuclear pursuits.

By contrast, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Friday became the first Western leader to call Putin in two years, without first making sure that Kiev and his country’s allies were on the same level and with no prospect of success. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan soon followed with ideas leaking out about a peace plan he wants to broker.

Both men rushed through the door opened by Trump calling for a quick end to the war, and both did so for personal political gain. Solz is headed for a ouster after calling early elections. He is desperate for a miracle to turn his political fortunes around, and the result was his uncoordinated, unscheduled phone conversation with Putin.

Erdogan has seen himself as a mediator between Moscow and the West since the conflict began. He had early success in negotiating a deal to keep grain flowing through blockaded Ukrainian ports, but was less successful in the bigger picture. He has no intention of letting Trump, Scholtz or anyone else steal his glory.

As Zelensky said after Scholz’s call, (the German chancellor) risked opening Pandora’s box – and he was right. What is likely to result is a futility parade of bids to end the war, which can only benefit Putin. The Kremlin quickly dismissed as “unacceptable” Erdogan’s plan to freeze current front lines, delay Ukraine’s NATO bid for a decade and deploy international peacekeepers in a demilitarized security zone.

Ukraine and its supporters need to realign their strategy with resources, fast. Kiev’s forces are fighting as hard and as determined as ever. Their munitions supplies and advantage in drone warfare are in better shape than most of last year, but not enough to offset Russia’s growing manpower advantage. A war of attrition, a mobilization absurdly delayed by Zelensky, and a bold but ultimately unsuccessful gamble to regain the initiative on the battlefield by seizing Russian territory near Kursk all contributed. Ukrainian forces are now ceding territory at a faster rate than ever since spring 2022.

None of this is to say that Russia has overcome the multiple weaknesses that have cost it hundreds of thousands of dead and injured, without—so far—achieving Putin’s goal of returning Ukraine to Moscow’s control. And yet Russia can sustain its losses for longer. It also now has allies willing to supply weapons and even troops to bolster the war effort.

The Biden administration is right to release as much aid as it can before exiting the scene. Also correct, though too late, is the decision to allow Ukraine to use ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles against targets inside Russia. Ukraine reportedly fired one of those US missiles into Russia for the first time early Tuesday, targeting an ammunition depot.

The restrictions were imposed out of fear of Russian escalation, but Putin of course had already escalated anyway. The deployment of North Korean troops and its tactical ballistic missiles have already been confirmed. The DPRK’s Hwasoong-11GA missiles have a maximum range of 900 km and a payload of 500 kg, compared to 300 km and about 240 kg for the ATACMS.

Ukraine’s allies must coordinate their efforts to advance supplies, rather than compete to “win” the peace. Leaders, including members of the incoming Trump administration, must “discipline” their public and private messaging so that Putin is in no doubt that refusing to negotiate with Zelensky—as opposed to simply demanding surrender terms—would entail such a high cost that it could jeopardize his position in the homeland.

By itself, allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS inside Russia cannot achieve this. Nor can the rush to the front of $5 billion in new American weapons in the coming months. Neither is the Scandinavian initiative to finance Ukraine’s expanding domestic production of weapons, from ammunition to missiles. Not even a coordinated, orderly withdrawal of troops from Kursk to bolster the front line inside Ukraine, or better training and more effective deployment of newly mobilized Ukrainian forces.

However, combined with a coherent new strategy, these moves have the potential to quickly halt Russian territorial advances or even reverse some. This is hardly a utopian hope… the initiative in this war has shifted many times since it began. Ukraine’s growing advantage in drone technologies, alongside a deadlock on the ground and a growing long-range campaign against Russian troop concentrations, oil infrastructure and airfields behind the lines, could yet convince the Kremlin that the time is no longer with his side.

No matter how dismal politically, the Biden administration and other NATO allies should do everything they can to prepare and, in fact, help Trump. They need to change the dynamics on the battlefield sufficiently to give the next US President the “cards” he needs to achieve real peace. This will not represent the strategic defeat of the Kremlin, because it was never intended to do so. It could, however, force Putin to accept a ceasefire that leaves Ukraine independent and secures it from further invasion.

* Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East.