The fall of the Assad regime marks the end of a long chapter of its presence of Russia at Middle East. However, this does not mean that Moscow is going to withdraw from the region. Her decision not to fight for his status Bashar al-Assad – instead flying him to Moscow, where it appears he will remain for the time being – looks more like an effort to strengthen its presence in the Middle East by getting rid of a toxic asset.

In 2015, the deployment of Russian forces to Syria in support of the Assad regime was a milestone in the history of Russian ties to the Middle East. In this way, Moscow strongly declared its return to Middle East politics, where its presence had weakened greatly after the collapse of the USSR. For the first time since 1991, Moscow conducted a major military operation in the region. Not only did it save the friendly regime from inevitable collapse, but it showed its readiness to play an active role in shaping regional processes beyond Syria. In a sense, the Syrian experience became a necessary prelude to Moscow’s more active intervention in Libyathe Sudan and her sub-Saharan Africa.

The 2010-2012 Arab Spring almost led to the complete loss of all of Moscow’s remaining partners in the territory it had inherited from the USSR. The Syrian operation, by contrast, not only kept Damascus’ pro-Moscow regime in power and strengthened its ties of Russia with it Iranbut also forced other countries in the Middle East to consider Russia an important factor. Thus, the Russian military presence in Syria became one of the factors that led to the intensification of Moscow’s dialogue with the Arab monarchies of the Gulf and created another topic on the agenda of Moscow’s relations with Egyptthe Iraq and her Turkey.

After military intervention, Russia has actively positioned itself as a guarantor of stability and protection of loyalist (usually dictatorial) regimes from external and internal threats. Moreover, Moscow’s propaganda machine has always drawn parallels between Assad and his fate Hosni Mubarak in Egyptarguing that Moscow is a much better and more reliable supporter than the USA.

As for the US and the West more broadly, Moscow’s actions have created another channel of communication to compensate for the active cutting of contacts after annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Kremlin’s message was simple: like it or not, Russia is a major player and the West needs to talk with it at least to create mechanisms to avoid accidental clashes between Russian and US forces in Syria.

Finally, the Kremlin also relied on the fact that its efforts, like those of Russian oligarchs such as Yevgeny Prigozhinsaving Assad would sooner or later be rewarded with access to a piece of the Syrian “financial pie”. The fall of Assad, however, put an end to these plans forever.

Shortly after the start of the opposition attack on Aleppo in November 2024, Russia clearly and deliberately decided not to save Assad. Analysts tend to explain this by pointing to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, which did not allow Russia to react in time and correctly to the new attack of the Syrian opposition forces. It was not only a reduction in the number of soldiers, but also a drop in quality: Syria had turned into a kind of “cesspool” for the upper echelons of Russia’s military who had fallen out of favor with Moscow and for those officers who wanted to escape the war in Ukraine. Russia and Assad’s main allies – Iran and its proxies – have also been weakened by the confrontation Tehran with it Israel.

While all of this is mostly correct, we should not overlook another important factor: by 2024, Syria had become from opportunity to financial and political responsibility for Russia. Syria had lost its value as an asset for projecting influence in the region. Within eight years of Russia’s intervention, a number of new – more important – factors have emerged that have shaped the Kremlin’s relations with the region. These include Russia’s role within OPEC , increased trade and her intense diplomacy. Syria also lost its former importance as an element of communication with the West: the war in Ukraine also led to a decrease in contacts and became the main topic of discussion with Russia.

The war economy Assad created proved to be just that toxic environment that even Russian businessmen accustomed to many challenges could not do business in it. At the same time, Assad’s political stubbornness, his refusal to compromise with domestic opposition and regional neighbors, and the constant balancing act between Moscow and Tehranmade his regime a difficult partner.

Meanwhile, the Syrian economy, largely driven by the illegal drug trade and corruption schemes, began to show increasing signs of impending collapse. The desperation of the population, disillusionment in the military and cynicism among the intelligence services reached its nadir, turning the regime into one “hollow” state which lacked a solid base of support.

By December of this year, Russia was faced with a choice: to repeat the fate of the USSR in Afghanistan and take full economic, financial and military responsibility for Assad’s Syria (hard to do given Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine) or step back. The choice was made in favor of the second version: The fall of Assad, however painful it may seem, it opened an opportunity for Moscow to get out of the protracted conflict, which was becoming less and less profitable.

The Kremlin should forget about any return on the efforts invested in Syriabut he may well try to keep his military bases in the country. The new Syrian authorities have made it clear that they are ready to talk with the Kremlin and are in no rush to expel its army from their territory. On a regional scale, as already noted, the agenda of Moscow’s relations with the region has become so broad that the loss of Syria, while it may be embarrassing, it is far from being a decisive factor in the strength of its presence in the region.