In the first conversation between the leaders of the world’s largest economies about the war in Ukraine, Chinese Xi Jinping told American Joe Biden that the crisis “is something we don’t want to see”.
An ally of Vladimir Putin, Xi is under pressure from Washington not to support the Russian war effort financially or militarily, whose country was subjected to a harsh regime of sanctions that limited access to the global payments system and its own foreign exchange reserves.
Xi and Biden’s conversation, held virtually, lasted nearly two hours this Friday morning (18), night in Beijing. According to the Chinese foreign ministry, the leader said the US and China have a joint responsibility to maintain world peace.
The White House did not comment on the meeting. So far, officials have been openly saying that Biden would charge Xi about his neutral stance on the crisis, without criticizing Putin.
Both countries have been on a path of conflict since 2017, when the Donald Trump administration gave the first salvo of Cold War 2.0, with the adoption of tariff barriers against Chinese products, seen as predatory of the American economy.
The reality is more complex, and China’s rise since the establishment of relations between the communist dictatorship and the US in 1979 is a product of economic symbiosis with the West. Cross-investment and interdependence nuance the competition between the two sides that did not exist, for example, in the original Cold War between the Americans and the Soviets.
But it spread to almost every field, and Biden made it clear by assuming that he would prioritize the confrontation with China, an emerging power, a classic pattern that harks back to Greek antiquity, when Athens challenged Sparta in the 5th century BC.
But Putin has crossed American plans with his war in Ukraine, which threatens to cross borders and involve countries in NATO, the military alliance created by the US in 1949 to contain the Soviet Union.
In the run-up to the war, Xi has shown support for Putin and has even said that both countries should unite against Western pressure. Twenty days before the invasion, on February 4, the Russian visited the Chinese at the opening of the Beijing Winter Games and sealed a pact of “eternal friendship”.
It is not a military alliance, which would place the entire design of Western sanctions in another square, but a letter of intent. Since then, Xi has been questioned in the West. The US even said there would be “serious consequences” if the support it says it has identified in Beijing for Moscow materializes in weapons or money.
China and Russia shrugged their shoulders. For Xi, the war brought two certainties. First, what the Western reaction might be if it decides to forcefully carry out the announced plan to reincorporate the autonomous island of Taiwan into the continental dictatorship, and perhaps prepare for it. The US and its allies in the Chinese environment have even warned Beijing about this.
Second, that any outcome other than a humiliating defeat and eventual ouster of Putin will be good for China. A military victory, resounding or average, will make the Russian consolidate its power, perhaps in a dictatorial way, but it will remain isolated and dependent on China, in addition to maintaining the perception of innocuousness from Western pressures.
It is not yet clear how this would play out in relation to the sanctions regime, but it is possible to speculate that Beijing envisions Russia as its energy province and supplier of sensitive military technology.
The most extreme version of this is Xi’s more incisive support for Putin, transforming the rhetoric of both of the last few years, of creating a real bloc in defiance of what they call Washington’s hegemonic order. Beijing’s economic ties suggest this is difficult in the radical version, but the world has also seen incipient globalization collapse with the outbreak of World War I in 1914.
Contrary to this logic, there is the possibility that the whole scenario will go awry against China, leading it to some kind of accommodation with the US. This hypothesis includes the idea that Putin can escalate his war, using weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine, which would leave Xi obliged to condemn him.
Therefore, at the moment Beijing’s keyword is discretion and caution, waiting for events on the ground.
