Putin bets that the Ukrainian army will collapse before the Russian economy

The War in Ukraine is evolving into a struggle for endurance between the exhausted Ukrainian defense and the asyful Russian economy tested by sanctions and internal pressures.

The War in Ukraine has become a clash between two hourglasses: one measures how much the exhausted Ukrainian army can continue the battle, and the other how much the Russian economy can withstand the invasion without threatening the stability of Vladimir’s regime.

The problem with US President Donald Trump’s peace initiative is that Putin is betting that Ukraine’s hourglass will be emptied first, allowing him to impose a winner and win a place in Russia’s history next to the Wall of the Conquerors.

For this reason, the Russian president has been avoiding Trump’s proposals for “freezing” the conflict through territorial compromises, which Washington believed would be attractive to Moscow. On the contrary, the Kremlin adheres to its maximalist demands, which would essentially turn Ukraine into its subordinate and change the balance of power in Europe.

Trump’s latest ultimatum to Putin, to show that he is taking the peace talks with Kiev seriously, ended with no results. In the meantime, Ukraine’s European allies continue to discuss the possibility of the mission of peace forces to maintain peace that does not appear on the horizon.

What is missing, according to many politicians and analysts who criticize Trump’s approach to the peace process, is a coordinated US-Europe strategy to speed up Russia’s “countdown” and change Putin’s calculation. With the current course of developments, he can win his bet.

The Russian endurance

The Russian economy showed strong growth in 2023 and 2024, despite western sanctions, thanks to energy exports and stimulating high military spending. But pressures and deficiencies are accumulated, growth is receding, oil and gas revenue has declined abruptly and the budget deficit is expanding.

This does not mean that it is approaching a crisis that would force Putin to limit his war goals, WSJ notes.

“The problems are visible and grow, but the Russian economy is not going to hit a wall in the near future,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

Despite the deterioration, the economy can support Russia’s war effort for at least another 18 to 24 months before problems occur seriously, he said.

A decisive Western effort to tighten sanctions and better implementation of those already in force could reduce this time limit, as well as the lowest oil prices, GABUEV noted. However, it is difficult to completely stop Russia’s revenue from oil.

China and India are now buying most of Russian oil. India says it will continue to do so despite the secondary duties imposed by the US in August. The United States and Europe so far show a little willingness to punish China, which has the power to respond to any trade war for its extensive financial support to Russia.

Even though Russian public finances are dramatically worsening, this does not mean that Putin will prioritize the economy over his political goals, which are based on his historical obsession to restore what he considers as a “legal position” and a sphere of influence of Russia.

With borrowing limited due to international sanctions, budget cuts could hurt the spending on the civilian population in order to protect military spending. Recruitment in the army could turn to more forced forms of mobilization if the funds are exhausted for generous ranking.

Putin is not completely indifferent to the economic consequences such as inflation, which could cause widespread social discontent, said Maria Snegovaya, a Russian -specific issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. According to her, it is proof that Putin has tried hard to protect much of Russian society from war, both with his economic and recruitment policies.

The intensification of Ukrainian attacks with drones on Russian oil refineries and pipelines aims at reducing Russia’s revenue from exports and causing internal disorders. It has already led to a fuel card in some areas.

“It is becoming more and more difficult to maintain the image of regularity,” Snegovaya said. “The Russians are unhappy when war intervenes in their lives.”

But in a country that is becoming increasingly authoritarian, there are less and less ways for Russian society or elites to express their dissatisfaction or take action, he noted. He estimated that Russia could maintain the war in Ukraine for another three years, unless sanctions become much tighter.

Ukrainian strength

Based on the current course on the battlefield, another two or three years of war could lead Ukraine defenders to the limits of collapse.

Although the great Russian attack on eastern Ukraine in spring and summer brought only a few territorial profits, uninterrupted corruption in human resources burdens the Ukrainian army, which cannot replenish its losses as easily as Russia, with its much larger population.

Moscow’s military goal is not so much to conquer territories and to exhaust the Ukrainian forces, until Kiev is forced into tradition. Putin is likely to limit his goals and accept an agreement that Ukraine and the West could accept, only if he believes that Ukraine will not bend on the battlefield, while internal political risks from the continuation of the war will increase.

The continued provision of western weapons and ammunition will be crucial for Ukraine to resist, along with the development of its own military industry.

Stabilizing the lack of human resources is also critical. In the eastern area of ​​Donetsk, the main front of the battles, the infantry has been weakened so that small groups of Russian soldiers often manage to penetrate the large gaps between the trenches. Ukraine is based on mines, artillery and especially drones to neutralize the Russians.

Kiev is constantly improving its potential in drones to offset the lack of infantry, but it cannot defend the country only with a “robotic army”.

Ukraine pays the price for distorted recruitment practices, which have loaded the highest burden of recruitment to middle -aged men from poorer rural and provincial areas, protecting youth and middle class of cities. The recruitment in Russia is even more unequal socially and peripheral, but the largest size of the country and its authoritarian regime allow it to withstand it. In the most democratic society of Ukraine, this creates strong reactions.

“Social inequality is the main problem behind the infantry crisis. The recruitment agencies take the farmer from his tractor but not the lawyer from his office, “said Serhiy Ignatukha, head of Drones Bulava in the Ukrainian presidential brigade.

Like many tired front -line veterans, they are indignant at the large number of men’s battle of men who frequent bars and city nightclubs such as Kiev, Dnipro and Odessa. “We have to become like Israel, where everyone is fighting,” he said.

In addition, the rigid, Soviet -style habits of the Ukraine military administration, which many soldiers say they have caused unnecessary casualties, have also eroded confidence in the army leadership, as well as the willingness of the citizens to be classified. Many front -line officers and military analysts have pointed out over the last two years that Ukraine needs to reshape the way it produces and manages its strengths.

“Maybe we have not yet reached that crucial point where the need for change will force into action,” said Captain Olexandr Sirsin, Commander of the 47th Motor Brigade of Ukraine, who has criticized the Supreme Military.

Ukraine has repeatedly denied forecasts since Russia launched its general invasion in February 2022. Despite male and munition shortcomings, it continues to find ways to stay in the battle.

Ukraine’s most valuable weapon is our desire to survive, which helps us act in unorthodox ways, “Sirsin said. “Finding the way, where there is no road.”