Since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, launched by Vladimir Putin’s Russia to try to resolve its geopolitical disputes with its neighbor and with the West, a fear permeated the reactions of countries allied to the United States.
Simply put, the conflict escalated into World War III, perhaps involving nuclear weapons and the risk of the end of civilization as we know it. With the passing by the US Congress of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Loan-Lease Act of 2022, the Joe Biden administration tore the fantasy of military neutrality in the fray.
With the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and the near-war of 1983, at no point in the deadly balance of the Cold War, over piles of weapons that reached 70,000 nuclear warheads in 1990, Washington and Moscow placed themselves so directly face to face. This is a clear bet by the West, and the consequences are unpredictable.
This moment came gradually. When the war started on February 24, Putin included in his famous speech the threat that foreign interventions in the course of things would lead to unprecedented consequences in the history of anyone involved.
Five days earlier, it had carried out a major strategic weapons test, and four days later, it had put its nuclear forces on alert. Since then, he and his government officials have spoken several times about the possibility of using the bomb — outside observers even fear the tactical use, against Ukraine, of the weapon.
Initially, the threats paid off. In fact, the entire West saw Ukraine as lost at the beginning of the invasion, so much so that the US offered shelter to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian mistakes and Ukrainian resistance turned the tactical conformism of seeing Kiev return to the Russian sphere into a strategic opportunity to further weaken Moscow, grappling with the limits of its intimidating speech.
Before that, however, Biden and Western allies had repeatedly insisted that they would not participate in the war, citing the more apocalyptic risks, but by the second day of the conflict, military aid was already underway. It has now surpassed $7 billion, nearly double Kiev’s annual defense budget of $3.7 billion US alone.
Even it ran slowly, with several slacks put in place by European partners fearful of Moscow’s reaction, notably Germany so energetically dependent on Putin. But even the US held back impulses from the most nervous members of NATO, such as Poland, by vetoing the transfer of fighter jets to Kiev.
There was also hope that tough economic sanctions would deter the Kremlin. This could happen in the long term that the West seems to be betting on, but so far has not shown itself on the field.
Under the new law, Biden will be able to transfer up to $20.4 billion worth of US military equipment to Ukrainians without formal restrictions in place, such as the requirement that they be unused weapons and guaranteed payment in the event of destruction or damage.
The government has not defined any of this, but analysts say that the Ukrainians will have M1-A Abrams heavy tanks, F-16 fighter jets, Patriot anti-aircraft systems, among other weapons that would elevate Ukraine to the status of a small military power. As all of this has to include training that lasts months, it is yet another suggestion that the West is preparing for a long war.
Of course, they are somewhat virtual plans at this point, not least because Biden needs to define what he will transfer, and that would take 60 days of bureaucracy to start. That is, it is a window for Putin to use, whether or not that is the American intention.
Everything points to an attempt to resolve the conflict, already hinted at in the battle for Donbass (Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine), which is progressing slowly. The Russians are making gains, but none have been decisive so far. By everything indicated so far, the conquest of eastern and southern Ukraine, with or without the strip that includes Odessa, would already be sold as a victory by Putin.
The point is, according to a political analyst close to the Kremlin told Sheet, is that in Moscow there is growing dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces, which want to escalate the war, perhaps with a national mobilization not foreseen in the current format of “special military operation”. The mistakes of the initial phase of the Russian war seem to have been overcome, but there are doubts among experts about the allocation of resources to conquer the east and south.
To complicate matters, the signs of spreading are already clear, as the specific attacks on installations in Russia and the instability in the Russian region of Transnistria, in Moldova, show.
But, in addition to the increase in military aid, as the arrival of American 155 mm howitzers in the Donbass demonstrates, and even with missteps such as the stalled supply of German armor to Kiev, the Lend-Lease act calls for attention. lease).
The English name of the law passed by the US harks back to a similar act of March 11, 1941, when the US began helping Nazi Germany’s rivals, such as the UK and the Soviet Union, with food, weapons and technology transfer.
At that point, Franklin Roosevelt’s government came to be seen as de facto hostile to Axis forces, although it swore it did not want to see World War II up close. Nine months later, under attack, the US would actually enter the conflict. If the historiography does not see the Land-Lease as decisive, the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin himself would say that victory would be more difficult “without the American machines”.
As a rule, the equipment is loaned on a non-refundable basis, but there are future compensations. As the speaker of the lower house of the Russian Parliament, Viacheslav Volodin, recalled, Moscow only finished paying off its commodity debts to Washington in 2006, as did the British.
That would tie Kiev politically to the US for years, although, as in the condition of the Allies in WWII, it is far from a priceless penalty — in this strict sense, Volodin exaggerates.
Both sides use logical reasons for their actions, which obviously does not justify the ongoing violence. The Western argument is that Russia is the aggressor and Europe is its next target if Ukraine is lost. Moscow, on the other hand, saw the eastward expansion of NATO in the post-Cold War period, for which Ukraine would be the ultimate prize, as a reason for existential insecurity.
Be that as it may, the risks of the situation going awry only add to this arm wrestling, as when the Russians attacked positions near Poland or Western arms depots in Ukraine. Still, it seems easier to have an upsurge against the Ukrainians than a Third World War.
From a western point of view, it’s pay-per-view. There are those who equate Putin with an Adolf Hitler whose attempt at appeasement in 1938 only set the stage for the hecatomb that began the following year. For them, everything has to be done to stop it, before the radioactive effects of the atomic bomb of sanctions hit Westerners harder.
As a Russian diplomat told the report, the US is publicly playing as if Putin is doomed to fail. If they believe this, one of the two: either they are underestimating the adversary as the Russian did with Kiev, or it is fact and then the risk is that of dealing with an autocrat threatened with losing his chair sitting on 5,977 nuclear warheads.
None of the options look very appealing, for starters if you’re Ukrainian.
