Boeing 737 Max plane crashes resulted from cost cutting, documentary shows

One of the reasons Boeing became the world’s biggest planemaker was its obsessive concern for safety. Leaving this attitude behind led the company to the biggest crisis in its history, shows the documentary “Freefall: The Tragedy of the Boeing Case”.

Available on Netflix, the production investigates the reasons for the two accidents with the 737 Max model, which killed all travelers on board. The first fall was in October 2018, in Indonesia, and left 189 dead. The second, in March 2019, in Ethiopia, killed 157.

The tragedies generated surprise because they involved new planes, in operation for a few months, and because they happened in a similar way: the planes plummeted shortly after takeoff, after the pilots were unable to keep them stable. After the second accident, almost every country in the world banned the use of the 737 Max, in a move that had never occurred before.

The film intertwines technical details of the crashes, with realistic projections, the struggle of victims’ relatives for answers, and changes in Boeing’s corporate culture.

The American company revolutionized the airline industry in the 1950s, launching aircraft capable of carrying hundreds of passengers safely over long distances, which made international travel much more accessible.

Models launched in the 1960s, such as the 737 (for medium-distance travel) and 747 (for crossing oceans) were so successful that they are used all over the world to this day, with technological updates. One of these adaptations, however, is pointed out as the cause of the Max accidents.

In the 2000s, Boeing lost its position as the largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft to Airbus. The European manufacturer gained even more space when it launched, in 2010, the A320 Neo, a model that stood out for saving fuel, a sensitive issue for airlines.

Under pressure, Boeing decided to adapt the 737: put more fuel-efficient engines and relaunch it as the 737 Max.

The production of the model was also marked by the acceleration of production processes: employees were charged to avoid delays, and quality and safety checks were abandoned. Anyone who pointed out a flaw was criticized, or even punished, by the boss, which created a climate that encouraged the cover-up of errors.

So the priority has shifted from safety, a brand of the company, to profit-making and shareholder remuneration, say former employees.

Commercially, the 737 Max was very successful: the company managed to sell more than 5,000 units of it in the following years. To attract airlines, he used the argument that pilots would not need new training, as it was the usual 737. As training is expensive, airlines liked the idea.

However, the Max wasn’t all that similar to the previous 737. There was a new system, called MCAS, that served to automatically stabilize the plane if it detected that it was in a wrong degree of bank.

MCAS acted automatically, without pilots needing to do anything — a mechanism that pilots say they were not told existed. Documents show that Boeing sought to hide this, to expedite the approval process for the 737 Max and prevent authorities from requiring training to operate the new aircraft.

The system was conceived to compensate for the instability generated by the new engines, which are heavier than the previous ones, without having to make any profound design changes.

In another attempt to cut costs, the system relied only on data from one external sensor, not two, as is standard. Thus, investigations indicate that a failure in this sensor caused the MCAS to receive the wrong data and automatically forced the plane to lower its nose at the wrong time.

Not understanding what was happening, the pilots tried to align the plane, but they had to struggle with the automatic decisions of a system they were unaware of.

Later studies showed that pilots would only have ten seconds to correct their course after the MCAS went into action untimely. After that, the loss of stability would be so great that it would be impossible to resume normal flight.

After the first accident, Boeing sought to minimize technical failures. After the second crash, he said a systems update would be enough. The 737 Max received authorization to fly again in October 2020. To escape the bad reputation, they were just called the 737-8.

After being investigated by the US Congress, Boeing made a deal and paid $2.5 billion in fines in exchange for not being criminally prosecuted. The company did not give an interview for the documentary, but responded in writing that it refutes the criticism and that its aircraft are safe.