The Mercosur summit held in Asunción on July 21 marked the 30th anniversary of the regional agreement and gave rise to divergent assessments of its performance. For many, Mercosur did not fulfill its objective, as it did not conclude a customs union among its members, as agreed in 1995, nor even an effective free trade zone, as advocated in 1991, with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción. . For others, however, the judgment should not be so harsh.
The agreement gave rise to a broad expansion of trade, including a significant volume of Brazilian industrial products, and stimulated an increasing volume of investment among its members. More than that, it promoted regulatory convergence in the most different sectors of exchange, thus allowing for a more unimpeded circulation of goods and capital between member countries.
Within the scope of this evaluation, which is certainly superficial, it is worth highlighting the improvement in the quality of political relations, which evolved from recurrent tensions at the time of the construction of Itaipu to a generalized slackening in political and international action. In a famous speech at the Quai D’Orsay in 1950, Robert Schuman, one of the “fathers of Europe”, presciently stressed that the engine of integration lies in the breath of politics, rather than in the flows of trade and investment.
Mercosur, in recent years, has felt the lack of a renewed political impulse, indispensable to consolidate itself and offer Brazil the firm support to exercise the natural leadership that our neighbors expect from us.
The Asunción Summit brought a positive fact, which was the conclusion of the agreement for the reduction of the Common External Tariff (TEC). On the other hand, he introduced a note of concern, which was Uruguay’s decision (with a veiled Brazilian incentive) to start negotiating a free trade agreement with China, without the participation of the other Mercosur members.
This violates the spirit and letter of the 1995 agreement — that is, the negotiation of a common external tariff —, in addition to clearly conflicting with Brazilian interests, as it can form a corridor for the entry of Chinese products into Brazil without any counterpart. .
Most likely, the Montevideo initiative will result in nothing, as an eventual bilateral agreement with China could even require ratification by the Congress of member countries. As Shakespeare would say, “much ado about nothing” [muito barulho por nada]. All this at a time when Mercosur most needs a positive political breath and constructive initiatives.
A commercial understanding between Montevideo and Beijing would accentuate an ongoing process of increasing trade between China and South America, which has already reached 18% a year, compared to intra-Mercosur trade, which was around 10%. at 12%. If this trend were to continue, the Southern Cone countries would be integrating with China instead of promoting intra-regional integration.
More recently, Alberto Fernández’s visit to Xi Jinping marked a notable rapprochement between Buenos Aires and Beijing. The two countries signed agreements for the construction and financing of infrastructure works, the joint construction of a new nuclear power plant, Atucha 3, and Argentina’s accession to the Chinese New Silk Road program.
It is not up to Brazil to criticize this step, because it promoted even closer cooperation with China. But the expansion of the Chinese economic presence and its geopolitical implications suggest the interest and even the need to negotiate a modus vivendi in the Southern Cone. The leadership of this initiative can only be up to Brazil, as the undisputed regional leader, whether we like it or not.
China has so far been discreetly silent on this matter. The US, on the other hand, has repeatedly expressed visible unease with the advance of its “strategic rival” on our continent.
