The failed attempt on Vice President Cristina Kirchner on Thursday (1st) was the first attempt at murder in Argentina since the end of the military dictatorship in the 1980s. In those years, President Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) suffered two failed attacks on his life, one during his term in office and the other later, during an election campaign. In 1986, a bomb was found and defused by presidential security. In 1991, during a rally, a revolver shot failed.
In common between the episode then and the assassination attempt now, in addition to the stroke of luck that made the weapons fail, there is the climate of polarization that marks national politics. Alfonsín’s years were marked by the troubled transition to democracy and the judgment of the Military Junta that ruled the country in the previous period. Today’s Argentina is characterized by the fierce antagonism between Kirchnerists and anti-Kirchnerists, reinforced in recent weeks by the indictment of Cristina Kirchner for the crime of corruption during her presidential terms (2007-2015).
It is not by chance, either, that we have seen a growing number of cases of politically motivated crimes or threats in other South American countries, such as plans to kill presidential candidates in Colombia and recent events in Brazil, including the stab wound to Jair Bolsonaro during the 2018 presidential campaign and the murder of a PT militant by a Bolsonarista police officer in Foz do Iguaçu (PR).
Relating episodes of political violence to the climate of polarization is not merely intuitive. The association is supported by academic studies.
In research published two months ago, political scientist James Piazza of Pennsylvania State University in the United States relied on interviews with 1,800 American citizens and analysis of 85 democratic countries to conclude that, in fact, individuals with high degree of adherence to one of the political extremes are more likely to support aggression against opponents and that the level of political violence tends to be higher in nations with a high polarization context.
But not any polarization. Some political scientists divide political polarization into two types, the ideological or partisan and the affective or ‘tribal’. Ideological polarization is the classic division between left and right or between supporters of antagonistic parties, with well-defined programs. This type can be beneficial for strengthening democracies, as it encourages the debate of ideas and projects.
Affective polarization, in turn, combines a strong adherence to a political identity with an intense aversion to anyone who is on the opposite spectrum and is seen as an enemy. In this type, there is a tendency to delegitimize and attack opponents or leaders of the opposing group. Discussions about public policy programs or topics are secondary.
It is precisely the affective polarization that is related to a higher incidence of political violence. And this occurs, according to Piazza, for three reasons.
The first is the demonization and dehumanization of members of the opposing political group, generally attributing to them caricatured characteristics of immorality, evil or threat to society. This is what Bolsonaro does, for example, when he says that the clash with the PT is a war of good against evil, between those who are in favor of life against those who are against life. Or when he says he is on a mission, even to death if necessary, to rid Brazil of the communist threat. And that’s what Lula does when he calls Bolsonaro a “demon” or when his supporters call all Bolsonaristas fascists.
The dehumanization of opponents ends up legitimizing the use of violence, because those who represent evil or are devoid of human attributes can be fought by any means.
The second factor is the feeling of moral superiority, which justifies intolerance against divergent arguments or worldviews and creates a context in which politics is seen as a win-lose activity, that is, in which there are only winners or losers, without admitting a middle ground or the possibility that everyone can benefit from the search for consensus.
The third factor is how easy it is for leaders of political extremes to mobilize their supporters. This is a result of tribal behavior in affective polarization, that is, the tendency to resort to antipathy towards adversaries as a way of reinforcing affinity and loyalty to the group itself. The ease of collective mobilization legitimizes and creates favorable conditions for acts of violence.
Traces of affective polarization are currently evident in Argentina, Brazil and also in Peru, Chile and Colombia. In all these countries, it is common to see opposing political groups accusing each other of promoting hate speech and inciting violence. In Argentina, the tone of the accusations has intensified since the release of the criminal complaint against Cristina Kirchner, who claims to be a victim of political persecution.
In Brazil, researchers Mario Fuks and Pedro Marques, from the Federal University of Minas Gerais, measured, based on interviews, in a study published in 2020, the two types of political polarization, confirming the predominance in the country of the affective version, while the ideological one is only moderate, without a consistent opposition between left and right ideas.
The context here and in neighboring countries, therefore, is favorable to episodes of political violence, legitimized by the demonization of opponents and the feeling of moral superiority.
