Even we take into account the strong fluctuations from the White House these days, US policy towards Venezuela stands out for its inconsistency.

In less than two months, President Donald Trump’s government went through cooperation with dictator Nicolas Maduro’s regime and reaching an agreement on immigration in the midst of smiles, on a sudden return to the strategy of maximum pressure, with the revocation of Chevron. It is active in the country, which is a huge blow to the Venezuelan economy. The announcement of the resumption of expulsion flights to the country of South America last week is another sudden shift to White House policy.

This constant “zigzag” partially reflects the deep division within the US government and more widely on how Maduro should be tackled: after stole last year’s elections, blatantly altering the results that showed Edmodo Gonzalez’s victory, Should the international community follow the toughest line against Maduro? Or should he succumb to Realpolitik and sit on the table of negotiations with the authoritarian leader of Caracas to find common ground?

The clarification of this dilemma requires honesty and realism: in recent years, neither the policy of involvement nor the strategy of maximum pressure have paved a clear way for a political transition to Venezuela. They will need both carrots and whips, and we must be skeptical of those who claim to have the “magic” recipe to end this tragedy – there is none. I hope to be wrong, but maybe even in a decade from now, we continue to wonder how to resolve one of the most excruciating and costly conflicts in the area.

However, experience shows some basic principles for any country interested in pushing for the democratic change deserved by the Venezuelans: First, the pressure on the regime must continue. Secondly, sanctions that hurt the general population instead of targeting the ruling elite should be avoided. Thirdly, any smart strategy should focus on the breakdown of the upper scales, which are cut off from the country’s daily difficulties, the supporters and military allies of the regime, which have borne the burden of its corrupt policy. Finally, any strategy should accept that the rulers will allow a political change only if the benefits for them exceed the costs (which is not the case at present). Unless there is military intervention – which few support – a political agreement is a prerequisite for ending the impasse.

For Trump, this means the adoption of a disciplined and multidimensional strategy, which takes time and patience to shape – as opposed to his current unstable policy. Following the devastating attempt to build a parallel government around Juan Guaidou during his first term, Trump can justifiably want to follow the opposite approach: to conclude an agreement with Maduro, to accept repatriation flights and to release Americans. After all, Trump admires powerful men like Maduro and could politically benefit from reducing Venezuelan immigration, without worrying about moral dilemmas. This tried to succeed with the mission of his special envoy, Richard Grenell, to Caracas in the early days of his rule.

But Grenell committed a historical error when he openly stated that Trump was not seeking a change of regime in Venezuela. This reinforced Maduro’s position without consideration and disappointed millions of Latin voters who had supported Trump’s victory. Trump’s abrupt upheavals of Venezuela’s policy are directly related to Florida’s policy, where large communities of Cuban and Venezuela reside. Combined with the cancellation of the temporary protection regime for hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans in the US, these decisions will certainly affect the Latin American population of the state-an important restrictive factor in Trump’s super-realistic approach.

That is why the four guidelines mentioned are true: If Maduro does not feel that his stay in power is costly, then any policy – even negotiation – will be difficult. The removal of Chevron from the Venezuelan oil industry is wrong: it will not significantly hurt the elite, and will seriously harm the economy. The past has shown that Maduro and his clique can protect their businesses and money, while the poorest Venezuelans are borne by the cost of sanctions.

The third point highlights the differences between the leadership and its supporters, especially within the army: the daily life of the latter does not include the luxuries enjoyed by the political elite; the lower points of the army know that the current course leads to the disaster. One has to wonder how many of them secretly supported the opposition in the elections. The emergence of these disputes and building the base confidence in alternative policies will be critical to ensure the military support required for the change of regime.

After all, the resolution of this conflict has only two paths: violence or political negotiation. History shows that even the most complex scenarios can lead to successful political transitions, such as Chile under Pinochet in 1990. Something similar seems impossible now, but sooner or later, both sides will have to come up with a reciprocal compromise. Until then, the deadlock in Venezuela will continue.