Two years after Tempi’s accident, how safe are Greek trains?

“1. On the night of February 28, 2023, the IC -62 passenger train, with 352 passengers, operating the Athens – Thessaloniki route, departed from the Larissa station at 23:05, with a delay of 48 minutes. Almost at the same time, the freight 63503 Also delayed in the scheduled program.

2. Shortly after 23:18 the two trainings collided frontally, with the trading train recording speeds of almost 90 km/h, while the passenger train traveled at an estimated speed of 150 km/h, both within the permitted speed restrictions. The impact was fierce, and while the two trading machines were pushed into the line to a collision with the vertical retaining wall, the engine and the first -position passenger wagon of the passenger train were launched on the other side of the line, where they landed.

3. Meanwhile, there was a second, almost frontal collision between the passenger train restaurant and the first level wagon, loaded with steel slabs, which were the first subsequent vehicles of the passenger and freight train respectively. Following the direction of the front vehicles, the restaurant wagon and the next second -class wagon of the passenger train also ended up on the lower ground. In the meantime, a huge ball ball was formed that seemed to move along with the passenger train. In the fires that emerged at the lowest level, the restaurant and the second place were completely burnt down.

4. In total, 57 people, including 11 staff members or subcontractors working for the Hellenic Train, lost their lives in the accident, 81 people were seriously injured and 99 had slight bodily harm. A significant number of people, directly or indirectly involved in the accident, sustained shock and/or emotional trauma. “

This summarizes the National Air and Railway and Railway Investigation Organization (EPANAAM), the tragic accident that occurred on February 28, 2023 in Tempi.

Having been referring to human mistakes, chronic problems on the Greek railway, serious deficiencies in staff, poor maintenance and degraded infrastructure, ENDAAM stresses the Fatal errors made below (Lack of coordination, the accident space was not properly mapped), resulting in loss of vital information for understanding the causes.

Was the Greek railway safe in 2023? The answer was categorical: no. Today, are Greek trains safe? Members of the National Organization avoided giving a clear answer and were limited to responding that if the 17 security recommendations they have issued (to the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, OSE, Hellenic Train, National Security Authority (RAS), European Union and European Union and European Union) Temps, then yes, the Greek railway could become safe.

(See the full report in English here)

The 17 security recommendations

According to EPANAAMAm many of these recommendations exceed the responsibilities and powers of individual organizations and therefore cannot be applied without the support of the Greek government. Therefore,

– Recommended at Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure continue and improve the implementation of the existing action plan. This will create a framework in which the various competent railways will have human, economic and organizational means to meet the requirements for the development and maintenance of a sustainable and safe rail system.

– the OSE It must better understand the dangers related to the reality of the operation of the current rail system in Greece and improve the way it controls these risks.

– In addition, OSE must optimize the performance and reliability of infrastructure elements and manage the safety risks associated with them throughout their life cycle.

– OSE must regularly evaluate the ability of security -related staff and ensuring their maintenance. This includes all the abilities associated with non-technical skills but also on physical and psychological ability, not only when hiring new staff but also during his entire career.

– OSE should develop a performance monitoring system in order to perceive any deterioration of the performance -related work -related work by the stations or other staff who are critical to safety.

– In addition, OSE’s ability should be created to extract incidents and accidents. This will lead to the implementation of structural improvement measures that can create an environment that will support the work of business staff.

– Finally, OSE should maximize the availability of recorded data that can help analyze accidents and events and should consider the possibility of using these technologies to continue monitoring security performance in a framework without guilt categories.

– to Hellenic Train It is advisable to strengthen the management system of its abilities in order to ensure that drivers (and other personnel, whenever needed) that perform safety -related tasks are similarly prepared, that their ability is evaluated and maintained regularly and that duties are performed accordingly.

– In addition, a driver’s performance monitoring system should be developed to create the ability to perceive any deterioration in the performance of security -related tasks.

– the National Security Authority (RAS) It should develop an incident reference system to enhance the ability of the Greek railway sector to be taught by unwanted events. This system must provide the necessary structure and classification for the mandatory reporting of security -related incidents by the infrastructure manager and all the railways operating on the Greek network.

-At least just as important and even more urgent is the need for RAS to enhance its capacity to supervise with the aim of creating an opinion on the level of security of the Greek railway system.

– to Organization of the European Union for Railways It is advisable to take steps for faster implementation of action plans, on the one hand for the Single Security Certificates and, on the other, for the identified shortages that prevent the National Security Authority from effectively monitoring the safety management systems of the railway companies.

– in relation to that, recommended to European Commission Implement a framework that will impose on Member States to adequately and promptly satisfy EU’s demands on security policy, the functioning of national security authorities and national exploration organizations and the system of national rules.

– In addition, an image should be created for the appropriateness of the application of the EU -defined operational security rules in the national context of Member States at all levels.

– Finally, recommended to Greek Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection Develop, in collaboration with the various emergency services (Fire Brigade, Medical and Psychosocial Support, Police, Civil Protection) and based on internationally recognized correct practices, detailed instructions for an emergency and crisis management plan that will allow for a rapid, coordinated assistance.

This plan should include clear guidelines to coordinate emergency situations at operational and strategic management level, to determine the facilities, to adequately map the site of the accident and to prevent and reduce the risks of post -traumatic stress disorder.

“We didn’t talk to the Commander -in -Chief”

Since November 2023 and throughout the investigation, the EPANAAM team has access to all evidence, documents and testimonies of witnesses and accused, which were acquired through judicial investigation. Also, the team came into contact and consulted numerous organizations and interviewed more than 60 people and teams.

Nevertheless, the Agency’s research team failed to chat with one of the main persons involved: the commander who worked on the night shift of the Larissa station on the fateful night of the accident “Despite the fact that several attempts were made (in Athens and in Larissa), on different dates for several months. And that, without any obvious reason or motivation ” refers to the finding.